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Abstract 
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Introduction 
De-regulation of electricity industry in Europe has tended to start with a grace 
period of energy surplus inherited from the previously  expansive co-ordinated 
economies and further amplified by better resource utilisation from extended 
international trade. The regulatory challenge has therefore primarily been to 
allocate existing generation to consumers in an efficient way . However, as energy 
demand increases, due to economic growth, the challenge of providing new 
capacity surfaces. 
 The Nordic region, which has been a pioneer in internationalising and 
deregulating electricity, is now approaching this stage, ahead of most of the rest of 
Europe, which is still enjoying the grace period. UK, the other pioneer in de-
regulation, has under the lengthy phase of captive customership and amazingly 
high prices indicating some degree of oligopolistic control, been able to expand its 
generation capacity, and is therefore still enjoying a capacity surplus. Against the 
background of the 2002-2003 price spikes in the Nordic electricity market and the 
debates that this triggered, this paper discusses investments in new energy 
generation. While the Nordic case is characterised by specificities related to 
hydropower it also raises the more general challenge of capacity-expansion under 
a de-regulated market economy (Magnus and Midttun 2000). This challenge has 
surfaced prominently in the international debate, following extensive blackouts 
and price hikes both in Europe, USA and New Zealand. This paper therefore also 
discusses how the Nordic investment challenges of today shed light, on more 
generic challenges that may become more general European challenges of 
tomorrow. 
 
Economic and Socio-Political Equilibria 
Given the prominence of the energy sectors as general infrastructure, price 
formation and availability potentially figure high on the political agenda. We shall 
therefore take a broad political and economic view, where the socio-political 
acceptability and not only economic efficiency is of concern  (Parsons & Smelser 
1966, Dietz & Burns 1992, Freeman 1984, Zafirovski 2002) 
The difficulty posed by the deregulated electricity market, particularly as 
the market reaches scarcity and new capacity becomes profitable, is that the 
economic and political equilibria may not always overlap. The market process 
may generate prices that politicians find unacceptable, while such prices may be 
necessary to trigger new investment (Besser J.C et al., 2002). There may, in other 
words, be a set of economic equilibria that fall outside of the socio-political 
domain and a set of socio-political equilibria that fall outside of the economic 
domain (figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Economic and Socio-Political Equilibria 
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Some pure economic market solutions with a high degree of economic efficiency 
may imply socially unacceptable distributive effects and not qualify on the social 
criteria. On the other hand, solutions where the economic realities are neglected 
would be examples of unilateral socio-political equilibria where economic 
efficiency conditions are not met.  
It has been recognised that the Norwegian electricity market development was 
coming dangerously close to the social equity limits, given the price hike last 
winter and the following broad discussion about ways out of the Nordic energy 
scarcity situation. We can distinguish between four main paths: 
• Firstly, solutions have been sought along an endogenous market path, with 
strong elements of commercial and technological innovation. This path 
implies that solutions are sought through creative re-combination of 
resources in the interface between supply and demand-side, involving 
alternative heating, flexibilisation of industrial consumption, energy 
saving etc. 
• Secondly, a set of solutions have been debated that involve Government 
intervention in establishment of energy generation, and or modification of 
operation of hydro-dams to secure reserves for extreme climatic 
conditions. 
• Thirdly, various strategies for energy supply via grid-interconnections 
have been proposed. The argument here is that further internationalisation 
of electricity supply  will serve to stabilise supply and prices. 
• Fourthly, initiatives to stimulate joint Nordic programmes for diffusion of 
new renewable technologies 
All these paths have strengths and weaknesses and also have different 
applicability to the Continental European markets. Referring both to the current 
Norwegian experiences and to potential Continental applications, we shall sketch 
some of the challenges and possibilities that each path represents with respect to 
solving the investment/supply challenge under socially acceptable conditions. But 
first a brief overview of the Nordic price spike episode. 
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The winter 2002/2003 Nordic price spike 
The Nordic price spike arose in the autumn 2002 (figure 2) against the 
background of an extremely dry year in the Nordic area. Aggregate inflow to 
Norwegian reservoirs in the period from week 31 to week 52/2002, was only 56 
percent of normal. This was the driest autumn since the inflow statistics was 
established in 1931. In addition to the dry weather conditions, the autumn of 2002 
was colder than normal. These conditions led to a rapid withdrawal of water from 
hydropower reservoirs. As scarcity increased, spot and futures prices rose 
gradually. 
 
From the beginning of August 2002 to mid-January 2003 wholesale electricity 
prices increased with more than 600 percent from around 15 Euro/MWh to 100 
Euro/MWh. Since mid-January, prices have gradually decreased and seem to 
stabilize at a lower level during summer 2003. For a discussion on the Norwegian 
situation, see Johnsen (2003). 
 
Figure 2 Spot electricity price for Oslo in the period 1991 – 2003, weekly average, 
NOK/MWh. Source: Nord Pool 
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The price spike seen from a political viewpoint 
Politically and socially, this situation was described as a “power crisis” and 
strongly focused in media and the public debate. The supply scarcity and price 
spikes were painful for consumers without substitution possibilities or hedged 
prices and the Norwegian Minister of Oil and Energy had to take serious critique 
from public opinion for distributive effects of the exuberant prices.  The exposure 
of the public to spot prices in the electricity market through short-term contractual 
arrangements greatly contributed to this. 
 As a consequence, the Norwegian electricity industry had a dramatic fall in 
consumer confidence and the sector has been under extensive public critique. 
According to investigations undertaken by the Norwegian Electricity Association 
(EBL), the media wrote more, and dominantly negatively, about the sector in one 
month during winter 2003 than in the whole preceding year taken together, 
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Pladsen (2003). As calls came for stronger political market interference, one 
might argue that one was close to reaching the limits of political equilibrium 
conditions. The “crisis” was seen as necessitating public engagement and 
politicians, the regulator (NVE) and the system operator (Statnett) asked for 
consumption reductions in order to get more water stored in the hydropower 
reservoirs. 
Public opinion in Sweden and Finland, that were also exposed to the same 
underlying spot prices have been more protected by price “cushioning” policies 
by electricity industry in somewhat less competitively exposed end-user markets. 
Furthermore Swedish and Finnish customers are less dependent on electrical 
heating, due to more use of flexibly fuelled water based heating systems than in 
Norway, where electricity takes a dominant share of the heating market. 
 
The price spike seen from an economic viewpoint 
From a purely economic perspective, the situation appeared somewhat less 
dramatic, but still raised considerable concern. It was recognised that the market 
had managed to solve the scarcity and had proved robust enough to stand the test.  
There was market clearance, although admittedly at unprecedented high prices 
(800 NOK/MWh) due to pretty inelastic demand. Nevertheless, these prices were 
far lower than the price cap set in other commercial markets as for instance in the 
US where price caps of $1000/MWh or some 7000 NOK/MWh are applied. 
Economic theory for prices of commodities with storage predicts price spikes in 
periods when the harvest is low, see Deaton and Laroque (1996). As water may be 
stored in hydropower reservoirs, this theory applies for electric markets 
dominated by hydropower. Thus, some price spikes should be expected since the 
inflow or the hydropower system’s harvest, varies heavily with weather.  
 The Nordic market, in many ways, functioned as expected, the high prices 
stimulated thermal power generation in Denmark and Finland. During 2003, 
Norwegian and Swedish power generation was 30 TWh lower than in 2002 and 
Danish and Finnish electricity generation was 15 TWh higher than in the previous 
year. A large fraction of this generation growth was exported to Norway and 
Sweden. In addition, the Nordic net import of electricity from continental Europe 
was almost 15 TWh higher than in 2002. This has brought electric power to 
Sweden and Norway and kept prices lower than they otherwise would have been. 
 Furthermore, political appeals and price signals worked, and over the 10-
week period from week 49/2002 to week 6/2003, Norwegian consumption was 
reduced with 2.25 TWh or 8 percent (figure 3). About 40 percent of the reduction 
was made by electric boilers, which in most cases have changed from electricity 
to fuel oil. Another 25 percent of the reduction was made within the power 
intensive industry. A number of companies within this industry have found it 
profitable to reduce output and instead sell the contracted power in the market. 
The rest of the reduction, 35 percent, was undertaken by ordinary consumers, 
households, private and public service sector and small manufacturing firms. 
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Figure 3 Aggregate Norwegian power consumption (temperature corrected figures), 
GWh/week. Source: Nord  Pool 
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However, the fairly short period of prices above long-term marginal cost (LTMC) 
for hydro- or gas based generation (approximately 250 NOK/MWh or higher), 
indicated that the time was not yet ripe for investments in new generation 
capacity. 
 
 
Flexible decentralisation 
Coming out of the Nordic price hike is an experience, especially from Norway, of 
a potential for flexible de-centralisation, indicating that the answer to the price 
hike challenge may not only come from the centralised energy system itself, but 
rather from alternative approaches. In attempts to opt out of the high price 
electricity market, Norwegians have turned to extensively increase in bio-fuelled 
heating, and have also taken increased interest in energy saving technologies such 
as heat pumps. A wave of investment of small-scale local hydro has also emerged 
as decentralised alternatives to traditional, centralized large-scale supply sources. 
Finally, rental of mobile oil or gas fired back-up power turbines was high on the 
agenda last winter. There is an international lease market for such equipment, 
which may limit price spikes if applied.  
 
Relevance for other energy markets 
Many of the continental European electricity markets are still in the grace period, 
as they were  liberalised in a situation of large overcapacity. However, some of 
them have met short periods of price spikes: the Netherlands during some periods 
for reasons of transitory rules, Spain during the winter 2001-2002 for hydro 
reasons, Germany in December 2001, France and Germany during heat episode of 
summer 2002 and New Zealand in 2001 and 2003 for hydro and fuel scarcity.  
These developments can broadly speaking, be said to reflect normal functions of 
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the electricity market. However, spectacular price spikes and crises have also 
previously arisen under deregulated market regimes in California for reasons of 
bad market design combined with volatility from hydropower and natural gas 
prices, lack of reserve capacities and possibly some deficit of investment in 
generation and in transmission mainly due to environmental protection plans. 
Some have, therefore  perceived the spiking prices as an invitation to re-think 
electricity market design also beyond the Nordic context. 
 
 
Policy Approaches  
In principle, there are several approaches to coping with scarcity and investment 
challenges described above. Approaches may be characterised both along a 
technological and a governance dimension (figure 4). Along the technological 
dimension, some approaches implicitly or explicitly assume the context of the 
established large scale technological systems, while others rely on complementary 
de-centralised technological development. Along the governance dimension, some 
approaches imply use of co-ordinated governance, while others imply governance 
through competitive markets. Solutions to the scarcity and investment challenges 
may, however, also arise endogenously in large firms and industrial groups that 
command dominant market positions, denoted by II b where market competition 
tends towards oligopoly. We shall briefly review some of the most prevalent 
policy approaches under each of the four (or five) configurations 
 
Figure 4 Policy Approaches 
 
Policy of competitive exposure of large technical systems (Ia) 
A simplistic implementation of competition in a large-scale technical system 
represents the first step of de-regulation. The buildup under coordinated 
governance, under the previous regime, has tended to produce a centralised large-
scale technological system with considerable overcapacity when the electrical 
growth, in many cases, flattened out at the end of the seventies. Under such new 
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market conditions, there seems to be a perception among some regulators, systems 
operators and power companies that in decentralised competitive markets, the 
players lack incentives to invest in new capacity because of the large general price 
risk, difficulties to analyse specific risks and lock-in problems with long lead-
times and payback horizons. The implicit assumption being that one continues to 
be confined to large scale technical solutions only. 
From a pure market-perspective one might conceive of adequate 
competitive solutions as there will always be a demand-supply balance, given the 
right price (Hunt S., 2002). However, from a socio-political point of view, the 
worry is that pure laisser-faire market governance would impose extreme price 
volatility and even possible shortages, given inelastic instantaneous electricity 
demand (Hugues W.R. et Parece A., 2002). Part of the social and political concern 
would be with the large transfer of wealth from consumers to producers while 
capacity is added in response to shortages. This could violate the social 
equilibrium conditions (figure 1) and create a real problem of social acceptability, 
as shown by the social controversies after the recurrent price spikes in some 
American States in 1999-2001 and above all the Californian crisis, as well as in 
Norway last winter.  
Under type I policy conditions we would, therefore, expect the typical 
cyclicality of heavy industrial adaptation because of uncertainties of the volume 
of new capacities that would be installed under competitive uncoordinated 
investments and the sensitivity of prices to small changes in overall capacity in 
both directions (Ford, 1999): During peak periods under scarcity, one would fear 
the high price spikes, while after uncoordinated investment one might expect 
strong downward reaction of the market price with prices falling under the 
average costs as soon as new capacities are available on the markets. Entrants 
investing in merchant plants in the UK and in some of the Northeast US markets, 
with consecutive bankruptcies after a downward price turn, have harshly 
experienced the low end of the market. It may be argued that the type I policy 
approach is more cost-efficient than the type II, but it is likely to be much more 
volatile and more politically risky. 
 
Policy of  Reversal to Investment Coordination (II a) 
The challenges from the perceived negative effects of competitive exposure under 
large scale technical lock in have lead to calls for stronger elements of co-
ordinated intervention in the market economy. 
 Even under fairly liberal de-regulated market economy, reliability has in 
part been considered a public good, to be provided by the system operator in real 
time. In complement of the supply of this public good there are debates around the 
supply of “capacity adequacy” during peak which could be considered either to be 
manageable under market logic or to be provided as a public good (Besser et al., 
2002; Joskow, 2002; Turvey, 2003). In this second case diverse solutions are 
conceivable: a Pigouvian treatment with capacity payments on every transaction, 
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a Coasian solution with capacity obligations during extreme peak hours (Bowring 
J. et Granlich R., 2000) combined with a capacity market as a flexibility 
instrument (as discussed in the USA in the definition process of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission‘s Standard Market Design proposal), or else a 
governmental coordination for guaranteeing the level of reserve capacity by 
auctioning for long-term contracts (IEA, 2003).  
Moreover in some European countries there is a move to allow public 
authorities to programme and auction out long-term contracts with guaranteed 
price for the installation also of base load equipment. These are typically countries 
where the technological paradigm in electricity remains focused mainly on large-
scale technical systems, in particular because of the persistence of the nuclear 
option. 
The economic rationale is the supply of a collective good that is defined in 
terms of energy security (including limiting gas import dependency on the long 
run). This is the case in France where such measures were included in legislation 
in 2000 and the recent Belgian legislation. After the Californian crisis, the new 
European Directive on electricity and gas markets, which was passed in June 2003 
includes a provision allowing and inviting Member States to adopt such an 
institutional devices to cover reliability and control the risk of dependence on 
foreign energy sources (European Commission, 2001). This is confirmed by the 
draft Directive on energy security accepted by the European Council of ministers 
in December 2003 which enforces this possibility for the Member States.  
With the coordinated approach to investment this model may avoid the 
volatility of the previous approach, but possibly at some efficiency expenses. In 
particular auctioning instrument for peak equipment and base–load development 
reduces the scope for endogenous market function in the long term, could create 
overcapacity and therefore depress the market price. Moreover, it could likely to 
create incentives to free-riding by agents ready to invest by their own but 
choosing the unrisky long-term contracts by the bidding process (Oren S., 1999). 
 
Policy Coordination of Investments in Grid Interconnection (IIa) 
The perceived challenge of underinvestment under competitive exposure has also 
led to proposals for stronger grid interconnection, especially between regions with 
complementary resources and/or complementary supply/demand patterns. 
European power markets are currently not very integrated. There are 
numerous transmission constraints all over Europe, including the Nordic area 
which has exhibited extensive price differences over the last years. It can be 
argued that grid upgrading and new transmission connections may help to 
stabilize prices during peak periods. Increased grid capacities may as well 
mitigate market power problems in certain regions. Accompanied with 
harmonized access rules, tariffs and balancing arrangements, a grid expansion 
path may have certain benefits that could motivate governmental support.  
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However, the necessary transmission investments would be large and need 
heavy subsidies. Because of the complex grid configurations and physical 
interactions, dimensioning of the necessary investments would also need detailed 
planning, evaluation and licensing procedures. The experiences in the Nordic area 
over the last years has also shown that the presence of transmission capacity may 
not guarantee the utilization of the capacity, as transmission capacities between 
countries runs the risk of being under-utilised when congestion occurs within the 
individual national grids.      
 
Policies of decentralised flexible small-scale and demand side 
solutions  (III) 
Coming out of the Nordic experience, especially from Norway, is an insight that 
competitive solutions need not necessarily be sought within the large scale 
technical system as there appears to be a strong potential for flexible, de-
centralized solutions:In attempts to opt out of the high price electricity market, 
Norwegians have turned to extensive increase in bio-fuelled heating, and have 
also taken increased interest in energy saving technologies such as heat pumps. A 
wave of investment of small-scale local hydro has also  emerged as decentralised 
alternatives to traditional, centralized large-scale supply sources.  As several of 
these solutions are provided at the local level, without need of specialised 
transmission, such solutions have the advantage of competing against the sum of 
power and grid prices.  
Together with heavily increased power import from Sweden and Denmark, 
savings, in response to price signals, contributed to reduce the severe scarcity 
caused by the autumn 2002 drought in Norway and Sweden. The various activities 
were not only capable of limiting the consequences of the drought but they may as 
well resolve a potential future investment problem in the Nordic region.   
Both households, large metal factories as well as small and medium sized 
industry reduced their consumption. In particular, the behaviour of metal 
industries is interesting because these industries had long-term contracts with 
politically fixed prices. Still, this industry reduced consumption and earned good 
money selling the power back into the spot market, thus actively contributing to 
the general power supply. 
The price hike also led to creative exploration of alternative large scale peak 
power supply. Several parties planned to rent mobile plants or large ships for 
connection to the main grid in order to deliver electricity during the drought. The 
lessons learn from the Norwegian experience may be that the volatility challenges 
from the competitively exposed large scale policy approach may be at least partly 
resolved under a broader market conception. The answer to the price hike 
challenge may, in other words, not only come from the centralised energy system 
itself, but rather from supplementary de-centralised approaches, both with respect 
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to reducing peak power demand–side (IEA, 2003; Oren, 1999) as well as to 
increasing volume on the supply-side. 
 
 
Renewables and energy efficiency policies as partly unintended 
price hike solutions (IV) 
Support for so called new renewable energy, which is now taking on quite 
sizeable proportions on the European agenda, could potentially contribute 
extensively to European energy supply. In addition come energy efficiency 
approaches which contribute to lowering demand.  While the technologies in 
focus are generally small scale, the mode of governance is coordinated, as 
financing typically comes from public budgets or specialised levies and access 
rights. These policies can therefore be classified in our typology as coordinated 
small-scale technical solutions (IV). 
Support schemes for the promotion of renewables and CHP for electricity 
generation have been extended in a number of countries motivated by  
environmental protection, i.e. to the preservation of a public good, in particular 
climate stability. However, such schemes have also been motivated by innovation 
policy and the need to bring forward a generation of new energy technologies for 
a sustainable future.  
The European Commission has also been very active in these fields, and is 
trying to coordinate a variety of national support schemes including a range of 
instruments like feed-in tariffs, exchangeable quotas and bidding for long-term 
contracts. Taken together, these governmental support schemes for diffusion of 
new renewable technologies could have a significant effect on the development of 
new capacities in European electricity markets. The ambitious goal of increasing 
European electricity supply for renewables from 12 to 22% by 2012 could 
contribute extensively to boost electricity supply capacity (European Commission, 
2001) . This would clearly help to postpone price hikes, but also obviously 
postpone the period where the market signals would reveal to the ordinary market 
players the profitability of investing in new equipment or to enter by invest in 
generation units. 
 
Endogenous market coordination and negotiated governance 
as a policy strategy (IIb) 
It could be argued that there is yet a policy option for price hike control within the 
market governance model, even under large scale technology lock in, namely that 
of oligopolistic coordination under a negotiated political economy. One could see 
signs of oligopolistic configuration in several European markets as mergers and 
acquisitions concentrate the markets in the hands of a few large actors.  
The horizontal concentration movement in some countries like Spain, 
Sweden and Finland, Germany, may be interpreted as a classic response of the 
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market to a risk exposure. In France the defence of a strong vertical and horizontal 
integration is clearly linked to the will to preserve the capability to invest in 
highly capital intensive equipment.  
A club of large actors may firstly seek to stabilise prices at a higher 
average level than the competitive solution. However, such a club would also 
have an interest in stabilising the system performance within the social 
equilibrium space, knowing that excessive price spikes might call for regulatory 
intervention. The club could therefore be motivated to supply necessary capacity 
to secure smooth performance and would not have to take the competitive market 
effects of some over-capacity due to coordination of a gentleman’s agreement 
type. 
 An implicit or explicit “gentleman’s agreement with policy makers or 
society would then be not to push the price too high, in return for which 
government would not press for stronger regulatory intervention. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
If pursued simultaneously, the policy approaches outlined above are obviously 
going to have complex interaction effects. Whether the policy process will allow 
this to be taken into consideration is, however, another matter. By way of 
conclusion we shall first explore some of the policy-interdependencies, and then 
briefly address the issue of the policy process. 
 One of the early lessons learnt from the California experience was that 
market based regulation under a centralised, large scale system did not go well 
together with plan-based peak price cap intervention. While social equilibrium 
conditions were clearly violated by the market outcomes, this mode of policy 
intervention served to aggravate the situation. Price signals did not pass through to 
consumers and markets were not cleared. 
 The Nordic price hike was not met by price cap interventions, but did, as 
pointed out above, lead to calls for coordinated investment in generation and grid 
interconnections. Obviously these initiatives, if implemented, could have 
cumulative effects that might lead to over-investment. As alternative co-ordinated 
economy interventions they would firstly have to be judged up against each other. 
The effects of grid investments would, furthermore, have to be evaluated against 
the background of price and capacity developments in neighbouring markets. 
 Most importantly, however, both the grid investment and the generation 
capacity investment strategies would tend to undermine private, market based 
investment, as they are likely to maintain prices under the long term marginal cost 
threshold. Use of public investment strategies for price hedging purposes could 
therefore easily imply a permanently sustained public investment role. 
Furthermore, in the context of an integrated market, such investments would have 
to be coordinated by all involved countries, unless one country alone should be 
willing to carry the burden of total system investment costs. 
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 Less demanding, in terms of international policy coordination, is the 
options of decentralised and demand side solutions, beyond the large centralised 
large scale technical paradigm. The advantage for many of these approaches, are 
that they compete against the combined grid and generation costs. Institutional 
facilitation of such measures, therefore, remains among the most attractive and 
recommendable policy-measures to be undertaken. A more realistic threat of 
substitution from de-centralised solutions would possibly implicitly cap central 
system prices and thereby help maintain the social equilibrium. 
 There are also links between the decentralised investment strategies and 
environmental policy, which has a high priority in many national agendas as well 
as on the EU level. Environmental policy motivated support for new renewable 
technologies could, under an innovation perspective, be justified as a learning 
curve investment to close the gap between immature technologies and the 
market’s willingness to pay. As already mentioned, this would clearly help to 
postpone price hikes, but also obviously postpone the period where the market 
signals would reveal to the ordinary market players the profitability of investing in 
new equipment or to enter by invest in generation units. The large environmental 
externalities, as well as international coordination already achieved on investment 
in new renewable, would seem to make this strategy more attractive than publicly 
financed conventional investments in generation capacity. 
 At the end of the day, while de-regulation and competitive exposure of 
electricity industry still remains a dominant European policy concern, a balance 
will have to be struck against two other dominant policy objectives, namely that 
of environmental greening and that of security of supply. While the fluctuations 
derived from a lock in to the large scale technical system  - when it approaches 
scarcity - is clearly undesirable from a societal point of view, a more stable, but 
possibly fairly high price of decentralised energy supply investment and demand 
side management might be more socially attractive as it would both allow less 
public investment in learning curves for new renewables and also limit 
consumption and hence the burden on security of supply. The grace period may, 
therefore, be over also for energy consumers, who, under the initial phase after 
deregulation, with a power surplus, experienced prices at low short term marginal 
cost levels. 
 However, the ambitious European environmental agenda also demands a 
complementary “green” innovation approach, to secure tomorrow’s renewable 
energy technologies. If publicly coordinated green energy investments are made at 
a rate sufficient to make up for the consumption increases and the scrapping of old 
large scale facilities, one might temporarily get back to a lower price scenario. 
 Nevertheless, strong forces in Europe are still backing the large-scale 
technology paradigm. The argument being that the scale and scope of replacement 
of Europe’s aging energy generation capacity, cannot be adequately met by 
decentralised approaches alone. The challenge for this position remains, however, 
to strike a balance with the dominant market paradigm, which maintains 
competitiveness while not violating the boundaries of social acceptance. 
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